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INTERNATIONAL EMINENT
DOMAIN
Luis KUTNER*
O N MARCH 3, 1919, President Woodrow Wilson stated to a delegation
representing the American Jewish Congress:
I am, moreover, persuaded that the allied nations, with the fullest con-
currence of our Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine
shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth.'
The debate controversy between proponents of self-determination
vis-h-vis eminent domain was resolved with seeming dispatch. President
Wilson was devoted to the principle of self-determination of nations as
much as any other person, but in weighing the historical right to a
Jewish State in Palestine he confirmed the Mandate status granted by
the League of Nations. 2
The majority and minority reports of the United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine recommended the establishment of a Jewish
State in Palestine,3 the former making it politically independent and the
latter making it a part of a federation. The Arabs pointed out that the
establishment of a Jewish national home or state, in all or a part of
Palestine, was contrary to the principle of self-determination of nations.
This attitude was quickly disposed of when, after the General Assembly
of the United Nations approved the partition of Palestine, it was deter-
mined that within the boundaries of the Jewish State as approved by
the Assembly, the Jews formed a clear majority-there being 538,000
* Chairman, Commission for International Due Process. LL.B., John Marshall
Law School, 1930.
1 N.Y. Times, March 3, 1919, at 1, col. 2.
2 0.J. League of Nations 1007-12, Aug. 1922 and the Anglo American Conference
of 1924. (footnotes c. 44 stat. 2184). See also Bos, Self-Determination by the
Grace of History, 15 NETHERLANDS L. REV. 362 (1968).
3 Report to the General Assembly by the United Nations Special Committee on
Palestine, as reprinted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1947, at 3.
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Jews and 397,000 Arabs in that State.4 It
is obvious therefore that from a standpoint
of self-determination, the establishment of
a Jewish State in Palestine is justified. It
is all the more applicable to the creation
of a Jewish State since it was approved by
the Assembly. It is irrefutable that the in-
ternational law applicable in a situation of
this kind buttressed the principle of self-
determination as it was and is designed to
meet the needs of peoples.
Those in support of the Arab position
strongly opposed the establishment of a
government in Palestine which was free,
in the exercise of its sovereign power, to
Jewish immigration and by various other
means to prevent the establishment of a
national home in Palestine. On the other
hand, there was the Jewish right to immi-
grate, settle and work, and, after becoming
a numerical majority, the right to establish
a government in Palestine. This right was
not only based on the Mandate and the
Anglo-American Convention of 1924, but
arose also out of all the complex circum-
stances which brought about the Mandate
and the Convention. The historical and
humane need for a Jewish State so strongly
impressed the conscience of mankind that
the League of Nations, as well as the
United States determined, after the First
World War, that Palestine should become
the Jewish national home. Both the ma-
jority and minority reports asserted that
the circumstances entitled the Jews to state-
hood in Palestine. Some of those circum-
stances were:
4 N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1947, § 4, at 4, col. 3.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
1. Every civilized people constitutes all
or a majority of the population in
some country, while the Jews are in
a minority everywhere. They lacked
the opportunity of free development
as a people according to their own
likes but instead were exposed to all
the handicaps and sufferings of mi-
norities.
2. To them Palestine was not merely a
piece of land where they might settle.
Apart from their connection with
Palestine while they inhabited that
country, Palestine has been at the
core of their cultural life since they
were driven out of the country 2,000
years ago. The Jewish religion, rites,
festivals, law, poetry, fairy tales, and
mysticism were woven around and
permeated with references to Pales-
tine, and would not be what they
are without this central and essential
element.
3. Because of this connection, Palestine
was the only country in the world
where Jewish settlement had a rea-
sonable opportunity to succeed, and
not because it is a big country or be-
cause of the fertility of its soil. In
1948 it was a small country, about
10,000 square miles on the western
side of the Jordan and about 35,000
square miles on the eastern side.5
The land was considerably eroded,
and, as put succinctly by the majority
report, about one-half of Palestine
west of the Jordan was uninhabitable
5 R. NATHAN, PALESTINE: PROBLEM AND PROM-
ISE 101 (1946).
desert.6 But the Jewish settlers were
willing to work there and were capa-
ble of working there harder than
anywhere else, and they turned des-
erts into gardens. Several other at-
tempts at resettling Jews in various
parts of the world have failed. Only
in Palestine were such attempts suc-
cessful.
4. There was a need for considerable
shifting of occupations among the
Jewish people, and especially for the
creation of a numerically commen-
surate class of farmers. For various
reasons, originally under compulsion
and later voluntarily, Jews have
tended to concentrate in a limited
range of occupations. Shifting of oc-
cupations is a painful process and
succeeded only because the Jewish
people were, and are willing to suffer
the pain that goes with it because of
other compensations. In this case,
there were such other compensations,
psychological in nature, the incom-
prehensible nightmare of the holo-
caust and the cremation of six mil-
lion Jews, all connected with the
establishment of a Jewish state in
Palestine.
5. Experience prior to and since the
development of Israel has shown that
the Arabs in Palestine, far from suf-
fering as a result of Jewish imnigra-
tion, have greatly benefitted because
of higher standards of living intro-
duced by the Jews, better wages, and
better health conditions. Palestine,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1947, at 34, col. 2.
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and later Israel, has become a
magnet attracting Arabs from all the
neighboring independent Arab coun-
tries.
Israel and the Jewish people have been
characterized as intruders into the Middle
East, displacing other inhabitants. Even
sympathizers for Israel's existence may
concede this contention.
The contention is made that Palestine
was inhabited by an Arab population, but
the Zionists entered and settled on this land,
establishing a state with people from out-
side. As the late Jawarharlal Nehru was
reputed to have stated, "But the Arabs
lived there." This view is shared by most
Middle East scholars, many Christian
missionaries, and journalists. For example,
it is implicit in the writings of Professor
Frances Boudeau of Columbia, who was
President Kennedy's ambassador to the
United Arab Republic and in Fred Khou-
ri's The Arab-Israel Dilemma as well as in
the somewhat more sympathetic reporting
of Arthur Sulzberger of the New York
Times. This characterization of Israelis as
intruders lay at the root of hostility to
Israel by many Asian and African nations
at the United Nations. As intruders, Israel
and Zionism are regarded as another form
of colonialism. To nations where the
Judeo-Christian culture has predominated
an opposing, more compatible view of
Israel tends to counteract this negative
image as Israel. Under this view, the home-
land of the Jewish people is perceived as
7 F. KHOURI, THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA
(1968).
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a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy with the
ingathering of the Jewish people.
The negative perception of Israel and
Zionism as an intrusion in the Middle East
may be counteracted by a consideration of
the history of the establishment of the State
of Israel-a result of the unique position
of the Jewish people, as previously noted.
Many observers will acknowledge this,
but claim-whether explicitly or implicitly
-that Israel's present position was unjustly
achieved through force at the expense of
the Arab people. The Arabs claim the ex-
istence of Israel is itself an act of aggres-
sion in that the Arabs are denied the right
of self-determination. They claim the
Arabs were driven out of their land and
now live as refugees.
Self-determination, a concept developed
at the end of World War I, encompasses the
right of every people to choose freely such
forms of government and political and
cultural institutions as it thinks will best
correspond to its needs. The principle,
recognized in the U.N. Charter and re-
affirmed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, was designed to meet the
needs of a people-a cultural entity molded
by a common history, tradition and lan-
guage. However, the principle does not en-
compass an absolute right, as evidenced by
the need to maintain viable political en-
tities, e.g., the U.N. action in the Congo.
Not every locality or region can be ac-
corded the right of self-determination.
In the case of Palestine, two conflicting
rights to self-determination arise, that of
the Jews and the Arabs. The international
community through action of its decision-
makers determined that the Jewish people
were entitled to a right of self-determina-
tion in Palestine because of special ties to
the region as expressed in its historical,
religious and cultural experience. While
other peoples are a majority in some
country, the Jews were a minority every-
where and were denied an opportunity to
develop freely as a people, as demonstrated
by the Nazi holocaust and the inability of
Jews to find a haven in any country as well
as the need for the survivors of the holo-
caust to seek a place of refuge. A Jewish
homeland became imperative. In making
this determination the United Nations did
not preclude Arab rights as the 1947
Resolution envisaged both a Jewish and an
Arab state. The Arabs rejected this solu-
tion.
The decision made by the international
community was unique, fitting a unique
situation. Nevertheless, Arab sympathizers
contend that Arab inhabitants were dis-
placed and thereby deprived of their rights.
The dilemma can be resolved by the anal-
ogy of eminent domain from Anglo-
American law.8 Eminent domain embraces
all cases where, by authority of the state
and for the public good, the property of
the individual is taken without his consent
to be devoted to some particular use, by
the state itself, by a corporation, public or
private, or by a private citizen for the
benefit of the public. Land may be con-
demned for a hospital, highway or railway.
More analogous to Israel's rights is the
power of government to take land, with
compensation to the owners, for use in
8 Weinfeld, Eminent Domain Among People: A
Jewish State in Palestine and Arab Self-Determi-
nation, 21 TEMPLE L.Q. 223 (1948). '
public renewal projects by low income
persons or by other private persons for the
benefit of the community. Eminent domain
has also been exercised to acquire land
for roads or for irrigation. In some states
property may be condemned for mineral
exploitation.
Applying the analogy to the Middle
East, the Arabs have about thirteen inde-
pendent states extending over a vast re-
gion from the western shores of North
Africa to the Persian Gulf. The inter-
national community appropriately deter-
mined that some infringement on this self-
determination was justified to permit the
establishment of a homeland for the Jewish
people. Eminent domain encompasses the
principle of just compensation. Accord-
ingly, U.N. resolutions regarding the Arab
refugees, while providing for resettlement,
also recognized the principle of compensa-
tion.
The Arab refugee problem stems, in part
at least, from actions of the Arabs them-
selves. To permit total resettlement would
constitute a threat to Israel's existence.
Accordingly Israel has offered compensa-
tion rather than resettlement. A custodian
of Arab property has been appointed to
account for Arab property left in Israel.
Arab spokesmen reject compensation
stressing the sanctity of private property.
They argue that the Arab refugees have a
right to return and reclaim their property.
But their argument ignores the accepted
legal principle of eminent domain which
permits a state to take private property
and make just compensation.
From another perspective international
eminent domain may be regarded as an ex-
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pression of the principle of exchange of
populations as practised in central Europe
following World War II. Germans from
Polish and Czechoslovakian territories
moved to settle in the German Federal
Republic while Poles and Czechs moved
eastward. A similar population exchange
occurred in the Middle East as Jews fled
from Arab states in numbers which
equaled the Arab refugees.
Generally, world public opinion appears
to remain sympathetic with Israel. How-
ever, there are opinion-makers who are
either critical of or hostile to Israel and
seek to influence public opinion accord-
ingly. These include: anti-semites and
bigots, and partisans of the Arabs, e.g.,
Arabs living abroad, religious organiza-
tions who send missionaries to Arab
countries, investors in Arab countries,
scholars with personal ties to the Middle
East, Arab public relations agents, persons
and groups believing American interests
would be better served by supporting the
Arab position, the so-called New Left
elements which identify the Arabs with the
"revolutionary struggle against imperial-
ism," and certain other misinformed per-
sons and groups who regard the Arab
cause as just.
Aside from the New Left elements, these
opponents have existed since the proclaim-
ing of the Balfour Declaration. In addition,
such small Jewish groups as the American
Council for Judaism and the Sattimere
Rebbe have also been hostile to Israel and
allowed themselves, whether wittingly or
unwittingly, to be used by the partisans
for the Arab cause. The American Council
for Judaism, believing Judaism is a religion
and not a nation, and that Israel somehow
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or other threatens the Diaspora, and the
extreme religious groups, like the Natura
Karta and the Sattimere Rebbe, believing
Israel is sacrilegious since only the Messiah
by the will of God can cause the return of
Jews, have been as vehement in attacking
Israel as any Arab.
On the other hand, support for Israel
is to be found among partisans of Israel,
including world Jewry overwhelmingly,
persons attracted to the democratic and
progressive tendencies of the State of Is-
rael, investors in Israel, Christians who re-
gard the return of Jews to Israel as the
fulfillment of Biblical prophecies and the
forerunner of the Second Coming, persons
and groups who regard support of Israel
as expiation for guilt in failing to act to
save the six million Jews murdered by the
Nazis, those who see the support of Israel
as a bulwark against Soviet penetration,
and those who believe in the justice of the
Israeli position.
To both Arab and Israeli partisans the
issues in the controversy are emotional and
viewed in almost black and white terms,
though some observers, like Quincy
Wright, attempt an objective approach. A
program for support of Israel must be
cognizant of the make-up of both the sup-
port and opposition. Polarization should be
avoided. Dialogue between supporters of
Israel and moderate Arab partisans should
be encouraged.
Obviously, Israeli support can be
achieved through education, through an
understanding of the facts as they hap-
pened. The presentation should be objec-
tive, without ignoring the unfavorable. In
some cases, as regards Poland and the
attitude of some Arab groups, the opposi-
tion to Israel clearly reflects an anti-
semitic or bigoted outlook.
Anti-Zionism has been used as a cloak
for anti-semitism. It is difficult to deter-
mine in every case the motivations of per-
sons who take a position on the Arab-Is-
raeli conflict, but not every critic of Israel
is necessarily an Anti-Semite or a bigot.
Clearly, opposition to Israel, as such,
should not be equated with anti-semitism.
However, to many Jews, such a distinc-
tion may be difficult to comprehend be-
cause Judaism, as generally understood by
Jews encompasses more than a religious
concept in the notion of peoplehood-the
survival and interrelation of the Jewish
people-which is today expressed in a re-
lationship to Israel. This is a concept which
may not be easily understood by a non-
Jew who may not hold any animosity
towards Jews but still opposes Israel.
Familiarity with Judaism and the Zion-
ist movement demonstrates Israel's right to
exist. A thriving Jewish community existed
in Palestine until the Eleventh Century
when it was destroyed by the Crusades.
A smaller Jewish community remained
continuously and later was augmented by
the Zionist migrations. In a sense, the Jew-
ish people never really left Palestine, as
Jewish religious practices, prayers and
cultural expressions were identified with
the Holy Land, the Return, and the special
Law of Return passed by the Knesset in
1950. The Jewish people never relin-
quished their claim to Palestine.
In truth, Jewish settlement in Palestine
predated the Arabs, who conquered the
region in the Seventh Century during the
first Caliph. A large Jewish community
flourished even after this conquest. The
Turkish conquest occurred in the Ninth
Century and, in 868, Ahmed b. Tulun, a
Turkish general founded a dynasty in
Egypt and later in Syria. In the tenth and
eleventh centuries the Seljuq Turks in-
truded from the East to be followed by the
Crusaders who were defeated by Saladin in
retaking Jerusalem in 1187. In the Six-
teenth Century the Ottoman Turks con-
quered the region. At no time was there
ever an Arab State in Palestine or an in-
dependent Palestine state. Under the Otto-
mans, Palestine was governed as part of
Syria. The makeup of the population con-
stantly shifted.
In 1870, when the first Jewish home-
land movements began under what may be
broadly regarded as Zionism; there were
only 30,000 Jews and 300,000 Arabs in
a land where three to four million people
had once lived, where once vine-clad hills
had become bare stone and the once rich
valleys turned into malarial swamps. Suc-
ceeding waves of Jewish migration im-
proved the country and drew Arab im-
migration from surrounding lands, so that
when the British left in 1947 there were
600,000 Jews and 1,500,000 Arabs,
though during the period of the Mandate
the Jewish population increased at a
greater rate proportionately.9 The Arabs
were and are still attracted by the greater
economic opportunities generated by Jew-
ish migration and development.
9 17 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 134 (1965);
Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situa-
tion, 33 LAW & CONTIEMP. PROB. 5, 6 n.6 (1968).
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Zionism has been characterized by Pro-
fessor Talmon, an authority on nationalist
movements, as being the most humanistic
and idealistic of all such movements. Its
premises stemmed from Jewish ideals and
western humanist, democratic and uni-
versalistic aspirations, including the ideals
of socialist utopianism and Marxism. The
goal was to establish the ideal society.
No major Zionist ideologist ever ad-
vocated the displacement of the Arab
population, nor was this the intent of the
Jewish settlement movement. On the con-
trary, as stressed by Ahad Haam, the goal
was envisaged as one of living in harmony
and in cooperation with the Arab commun-
ity. Groups like the Hashamir Hatzair and
the Ichud Movement advocated the estab-
lishment of a bi-national Arab-Jewish state
and jointly cooperated with Arab settle-
ments. Ben Gurion stated there was room
in Palestine for both Jews and Arabs. The
Zionist movement further envisaged the
purchase of land for redemption. Large
tracts of this land were owned by absentee
land owners residing in Turkey. The Jew-
ish National Fund was established to col-
lect money from Jews throughout the
world and to buy land and undertake re-
forestation and other reclamation projects.
No Zionist ever contemplated the forcible
occupation of Arab land.
When the Jewish migration first began,
no nationalist consciousness was encoun-
tered. Jewish settlements did, however, en-
counter attacks by marauding Bedouins
intent only on robbery and mayhem. How-
ever, by the time of the Balfour Declaration,
a strong national consciousness had devel-
oped among Arab intellectuals and there
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was opposition to the establishment of the
Mandate. Nevertheless, during the first
decade of the Mandate relative calm and
harmony existed between the Jewish
settlers and the Arabs. Unlike the Jewish
community, which, through the establish-
ment of the Jewish Agency, in effect,
maintained an autonomous government,
the Arab leaders could not unite due to
the bitter struggle ensuing between al-Haj
Muhammad Amin al-Husseni, the Grand
Mufti of Jerusalem, and the more moderate
Raghib Nashashibi, mayor of Jerusalem.
In 1929 and during the 1930's, the ex-
tremist faction, led by the Grand Mufti and
manifesting anti-semitism and perpetrating
pogroms and other attacks upon Jews, led
a revolt against the Mandate. By the as-
sassination of moderate Arabs who sought
to cooperate with the Jews, this faction
induced polarization. The Arab community
leaders comprising the upper class rejected
all compromises, including proposals for a
bi-national or federal state.
In 1938 the Peel Commission proposed
the establishment of a Jewish and an Arab
state which the Arabs rejected. The Arab
leaders even refused to come to London to
testify before the Commission or to nego-
tiate with Jews. They insisted on the estab-
lishment of an all Arab state.
With the continuance of this rigid
position after World War II, the United
Nations found that the Partition Plan, as
finally adopted by the General Assembly,
was the only alternative-at least the only
one having the merit of receiving the ac-
ceptance of the Jewish community. The
Jews had previously accepted an Anglo-
American commission proposal calling for
the admission of 100,000 Jews, but this
was also rejected by the Arab leaders. They
consistently refused to make any conces-
sions to produce an equitable resolution.
The situation which developed was, to
a great extent, beyond the control of either
the Israelis or the Arabs, resulting from
inadvertent or wilful British Machiavellian-
ism. In the McMahon Declarations of 1915
Arab leaders were promised independence
and control of the Middle East, excluding
the region encompassing Palestine, in re-
turn for revolting against the Ottoman
Empire. In the Sykes-Picot Agreements
Britain and France agreed to carve out the
area and the Balfour Declaration was is-
sued providing for a Jewish homeland in
Palestine. These agreements were clearly
contradictory.
Subsequently, the Balfour Declaration
was affirmed by the Allied powers at Ver-
sailles and in the League of Nations with
Britain acting as the Mandatory power.
The British administrators were prejudiced
against the Jews and favored the Arab
leaders, encouraging division and dis-
couraging tendencies to promote coopera-
tion. The British failed to protect the Jew-
ish community and attempted to seize arms
acquired by Jewish settlers who sought to
protect themselves. The administration
tended to surrender to the demands of the
extremists and, after 1938, Britain, with
the adoption of the White Paper, pursued
a policy of appeasement. At the time when
Nazi persecutions were in full fury, Britain
imposed barriers on Jewish immigration
and actually thwarted efforts to save Jews
from the Nazi gas chambers. Jewish
refugees were forced to drown in leaky
ships, such as the Struina, which were pre-
vented from landing in Palestine.
Following World War II the British,
with Ernest Bevin as foreign minister, con-
tinued this policy, manifesting total insen-
sitivity to the need of the survivors of the
concentration camps for a place to migrate
and to obliterate the effects of the holo-
caust. These policies led to terrorist ac-
tivities by Jewish groups against British
authorities and the undertaking of illegal
immigration to Palestine. The Jewish cause
attracted the support of public opinion in
the United States and other Western coun-
tries and in Britain itself.
Britain, weakened by the war and find-
ing itself beleaguered, could not maintain
the Mandate and finally referred the mat-
ter to the United Nations for guidance. The
General Assembly referred the controversy
to a United Nations Special Committee on
Palestine which heard testimony and in-
vestigated the matter. The majority of the
Committee proposed the Partition Plan
while a minority proposed a federal state.
The Arab groups rejected both proposals
while the Jews accepted the Partition Plan
which was adopted as a recommendation
by the General Assembly on November
29, 1947. Both the United States and the
Soviet Union supported the Plan. The Arab
groups announced their opposition. Britain
opposed the Plan and refused to allow a
United Nations Commission to enter Pal-
estine to implement it. Arab terrorist
groups committed acts of violence, such
as attacking an Hadassah ambulance con-
voy near Jerusalem, killing doctors and
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nurses. The British interfered with the
efforts of Jews to protect themselves, while
either looking the other way or aiding and
abetting Arab acts of terrorism, thus al-
lowing the situation to deteriorate. The
British announced that they would leave
on May 14, 1948, and did leave in a man-
ner calculated to create the greatest amount
of chaos.
During this period the American posi-
tion vacillated towards abandoning the
Partition Plan and proposing a United
Nations Trusteeship. However, when the
British left abruptly, the Jewish community
proclaimed the State of Israel which was
quickly recognized by the United States
and the Soviet Union. This was immedi-
ately followed by an invasion of armed
forces from neighboring Arab states al-
legedly to protect the Arab inhabitants of
Palestine. Trygve Lie, the then Secretary
General of the United Nations, character-
ized the Arab action as an aggression con-
trary to the U.N. Charter and urged the
Security Council to take whatever action
necessary, including sanctions, against the
Arab states. The Security Council and the
International Community failed, both be-
fore and after May 14, 1948 to take any
concrete action to maintain peace in the
Middle East. No international police force
was sent into the area.
The result was that the maintenance of
order had to be accomplished by the newly
proclaimed state of Israel, forced to defend
itself from extinction by Arab armies.
Propagandists in the Arab states threatened
to perpetrate a great massacre. The Is-
raelis, who were better organized and had
a greater will to fight, proved to be militar-
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ily superior to the Arab armies. The con-
flict ended with a cease-fire and armistice
agreements.
A by-product of the conflict was the
Arab refugee problem. Even before the
State of Israel was proclaimed, the leaders
of the Palestine Arab community left,
leaving their people leaderless and in con-
fusion. Arab propagandists called on the
Arab inhabitants to leave, proclaiming that
the Arab armies would quickly drive out
the Jews and that they would then return
to claim Jewish properties. Despite the
urgings of Jewish leaders that the Arabs
remain, such as in Haifa, the Arab com-
munity left en masse.
The war as such, like all wars, inevita-
bly caused a population displacement. The
desire of many Arabs to leave, particularly
the elite, may also have been prompted by
the fear that, if triumphant, they would
massacre or commit terrorist acts on Jews,
the Jews would treat them the same way.
The Grand Mufti, who was by then in
Egypt, had been a guest of Hitler during
World War II and assisted in promoting
the Nazi extermination. Some Arab fac-
tions conceived of making the Grand Mufti
the head of an Arab government in Pal-
estine and he had actively promoted Arab
terrorist activities.
Professor Fred Khouri, a sympathizer
of the Arab cause and an opponent of
Israel admits the Arab leaders bear at least
some responsibility for the refugee prob-
lem;
The Arabs-if only because of their own
ineptness, overconfidence, and lack of flex-
ibility-shared responsibility for the refu-
gee situation with Israel and others. The
shortsighted Palestine Arab leaders failed
to prepare their own people either to be
victorious in any armed struggle with the
Zionists or to live with Zionist aspirations.
Shortly after the passage of the UN parti-
tion resolution in November, 1947, many
frightened and selfish Palestine Arab leaders
fled at the first sign of trouble, leaving
their people disorganized and an easy prey
to rumors and fears. The armed Arab in-
tervention on May 15, 1948, precipitated
such widespread and large-scale fighting
throughout Palestine that many other Arabs
fled their homes to avoid the dangers of
warfare. Moreover, this intervention had
been so badly planned and executed that
it had led to a humiliating defeat which
prevented most of the refugees from re-
turning to their homes. The Arabs had,
therefore, helped to create the refugee
problem.30
Israel has feared the mass return of the
refugees as constituting a potential Trojan
Horse. The Israelis have sought a regional
solution of the problem. A considerable
number of refugees who were members of
immediate families remaining in Israel were
repatriated. Though the refugees in Jordan
were accorded full citizenship status, in
many instances the refugees were not in-
tegrated with the general community but
forced to live in camps. The political
leaders sought to use the refugees for
political purposes insisting on repatriation
to Israel, citing U.N. resolutions to that
effect. However, as Professor Khouri ob-
serves:
Since the overwhelming majority of UN
members had repeatedly voted for resolu-
10 F. KHOURI, supra note 7.
tions reaffirming paragraph 11 of Reso-
lution 194(111), the Arabs stood on strong
legal and moral grounds whenever they
called upon the UN to carry out the terms
of this paragraph. But they weakened their
position whenever they stressed only those
parts of the resolution which they favored
and when they tried to demand more than
it actually provided for. For instance, al-
though some Arab governments had for-
mally agreed to accept those refugees who
did not wish to be repatriated, too fre-
quently Arab officials, fearful of antago-
nizing the refugees and their supporters,
emphasized only the principle of repatria-
tion, largely ignoring the provision for re-
settlement in Paragraph 11. By taking this
position, these officials not only supplied a
strong basis for Israel's charge that the
Arabs were deliberately seeking a mass re-
turn of the refugees in order to undermine
Israel's security, but they also made it far
more difficult to obtain support within the
UN for the implementation of the repatri-
ation and compensation provisions of UN
resolutions. In addition, Arab leaders gen-
erally neglected to mention the fact that
paragraph 11 specifically stated that only
those refugees "wishing to . . . live in
peace with their neighbors should be per-
mitted" to return to their homes in Israel."'
Israel was willing to compensate the
refugees for the property which they had
left and appointed a custodian to be in
charge of the property. Bank accounts
were unblocked. But Arab leaders insisted
on repatriation. At the same time Arab
government leaders, particularly after
1954, called for the destruction of Israel.
There were expressions that the returning
Arab refugees would not accept "alien
rule", and, since the June War, leaders of
11 Id. at 170-71.
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Arab terrorist groups recruited from the
refugees stated openly that they do not ac-
cept the existence of the State of Israel.
The displacement of population caused by
the June War increased the number of
refugees. Israel's occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza resulted in placing refugees
under Israel jurisdiction.
The international community, in recog-
nizing the Jewish right to self-determina-
tion, also recognized the rights of the Arab
inhabitants. The Balfour Declaration pro-
vided for the establishment of a national
home, respecting the civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish communities.
The rights of the non-Jewish communities
were also recognized in the Mandate for
Palestine. The Partition Resolution also
provided for Arab rights in providing for
the establishment of both an Arab and
Jewish state in Palestine. However, the
Arab leaders refused to abide by these
declarations which provided for both Jew-
ish and Arab self-determination as called
for by the international community.
If the Arab armies had triumphed doubt
exists as to whether an Arab state would
have been established. King Abdullah of
Jordan envisaged conquering Palestine
and perhaps Syria to establish a greater
Syria. Jordan, in controlling the West Bank
from 1948 to 1967 did not establish a
Palestine state for this area and resisted
such efforts. The Arab states have them-
selves failed to adhere consistently to the
principle of self-determination. In the West
Irian Case, when Indonesia threatened to
use force to take over territory, a proposal
to resolve the matter on the basis of self-
determination was opposed by the United
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Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Leba-
non and the Soviet Union.12
The international community has im-
posed limits on the principle of self-deter-
mination as demonstrated by the Congo
operation. Regionalism must not be carried
to extremes, but must be compromised
with overriding needs for the existence of
larger governmental units as conducive to
international peace and territorial viability.
The Arab peoples have been accorded self-
determination through the establishment
of about thirteen Arab states. The Jewish
people, as recognized by the international
community, are entitled to national deter-
mination in that particular region to which
they have a peculiar historical, religious
and cultural attachment.
Some of the Arab groups mention the
goal of a state in Palestine which is neither
Jewish nor Arab, but both. However, this
approach was rejected by Arab leaders
when first proposed by some Jewish leaders
during the period of the Mandate. More-
over, the acts of terrorism committed by
these groups are not likely to evoke the
kind of trust to make such an approach
possible. Experience elsewhere does not
hold promise for bi-nationalities.
There has also been a proposal for the
establishment of a federal state with Is-
rael in a federal relation with the Arab
states. The Arab leaders rejected such an
approach before 1948, and, though there
may be some Arabs who now favor this
12 Halderman, Some International Constitutional
Aspects of the Palestine Case, 33 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 78, 80 (1968).
solution, it does not appear to have wide-
spread support. Moreover, efforts for unit-
ing or federalizing the Arab states have not
been successful.
The overriding problem in the Middle
East is the refusal of the Arab leadership
to accept the existence of the State of Is-
rael and to negotiate a peace settlement.
They sought to strangle Israel at birth.
The Israeli victory resulted in territory
which exceeded that alloted by the Par-
tition resolution. The Arab leaders con-
ditioned peace on limiting Israel to the
area alloted by the Partition Plan and in
calling for the repatriation of Arab refu-
gees, ignoring that the Partition Plan en-
visaged the peaceful resolution of the con-
flict and also the establishment of an Arab
state. For Israel to have ceded territory
would have meant occupation of additional
territory by Egypt and Jordan. Further-
more, the then existing boundaries were in-
secure so that the ceding of territory would
only have created further insecurity. How-
ever, it may be granted that in some in-
stances Israel set the boundary lines as re-
flected in the Armistice Agreement a bit
sharply, particularly vis-h-vis Lebanon.
Statements by Arab leaders, particularly
after 1953, indicated that their goal was
not the Partition boundaries but the de-
struction of Israel. The Arab position
amounted to a zero sum game with Israel
making all concessions, including its very
right to exist. Border attacks increased and
Israel shipping through the Suez Canal and
the Gulf of Aqaba was blocked. A huge
infusion of arms from the Soviet Union
increased tension culminating in continual
terrorist activity and finally in the Sinai
Campaign. Israel, after occupying the
Sinai, Gaza and Sharm el Sheik, agreed to
withdraw in accordance with an agreement
providing for the stationing of a United
Nations Emergency Force along its border
with Egypt and, at Sharm el Sheik, to pro-
tect free navigation through the Gulf of
Aqaba. Israel was also assured the right to
navigate through the Suez Canal, a right
which the international community refused
to implement. However, even after Sinai
the Arab leaders continued to call for the
destruction of Israel.
Terrorist raids continued and by 1967
equaled in intensity that which prevailed
prior to the Sinai Campaign as the Arab
states again received a heavy infusion of
Soviet arms. The events leading up to the
June War are still a bit obscure, but appear
to have emanated from Israel's response
to Syrian border raids leading to a penetra-
tion of Syrian air space and the shooting
down of six Syrian planes. Statements by
Israeli leaders warning Syria of reprisal
were distorted by Arab propagandists to
imply Israel threatened to overthrow the
Syrian government.
A rivalry and intrigue existed between
Nasser, supported by Soviet assistance,
and King Hussein of Jordan and King
Feisal of Saudi Arabia who were supported
by the United States. The latter goaded
Nasser to take a stronger stand against
Israel. At the same time the Soviets dis-
seminated false intelligence that Israel
was mobilizing against Syria. A'rb propa-
gandists mobilized public opinion to a
frenzy calling for the destruction of Israel.
Nasser was ridiculed for hiding behind the
skirts of the United Nations Emergency
Force. To maintain his influence in the
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Arab world Nasser was compelled to call
for the withdrawal of United Nations
forces. Secretary General U Thant im-
mediately and arbitrarily acceded uni-
laterally, contending that the forces were
present subject to Egyptian consent and be-
cause contingents from Yugoslavia and
India demanded to be withdrawn. This,
however, was in contravention to prior
agreement between Israel and Dag Ham-
marskjold to the effect that the forces
would not be withdrawn pending con-
sideration by the Security Council.
Nasser sent military contingents into the
Sinai and the Gaza strip with his author-
ized terrorist activities creating havoc.
With the withdrawal of UNEF from Sharm
el Sheik Nasser reimposed his blockade on
Israel shipping. Nasser's spokesman Huh-
ammed Hassan Hey Kahl, writing in Al
Ahram, proclaimed that Israel now faced
the alternative of economic strangulation
or of going to war and facing destruction
in battle, while another Arab writer stated
it would be necessary to attack. Nasser
made an alliance with Jordan and Feisal of
Saudi Arabia who stated there could be
no peace in the Middle East as long as
Israel exists. Arab statesmen called for no
mercy to Israeli civilians.
The international community again
proved ineffective and shockingly in-
different. The Security Council, beset with
the Soviet and French vetoes, was in-
capable of taking any action, nor was
there any inclination for the United States,
despite the Eisenhower Doctrine, to come
to Israel's assistance. After procrastinating
for almost a month to await international
action Israel invoked its right of self-de-
fense by bombing Egyptian airports and
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invading the Sinai to open navigation in
the Gulf of Aqaba. Pursuant to agreement
with Nasser, Hussein invaded Jerusalem
and other parts of Israel despite Israel's
assurance of no desire to attack Jordan.
The victory has eliminated the threat to
Israel's existence. Evidence had indicated
Nasser did have plans to invade Israel and
had ordered his troops to kill all Israelis
sparing no one. King Hussein had issued
similar orders. United Nations politicians
ignored these sickening facts.
Abba Eban has indicated Israel's willing-
ness to withdraw from the occupied terri-
tories after negotiation of a peace treaty
achieved through direct negotiation. U.N.
Security Resolution No. 242 (1967) of 22
November 1967 emphasized the inadmis-
sibility of the acquisition of territory by
war and affirmed the establishment of a
just and lasting peace, including the ap-
plication of the principles of "withdrawal
of Israeli armed forces from territories of
recent conflict" and "termination of all
claims or states of belligerency and respect
for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of every state in the area and their
right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or
acts of force.' 13 The Resolution signifi-
cantly did not call for withdrawal to the
armistice lines as claimed by the Arab
leaders and provides for "recognized
boundaries," meaning boundaries based on
negotiation.
13 See Sabin, Landes, Pollacic & Stroup, The
Arabs Need and Want Peace, But-, report de-
livered for the Mission of American Professors
for Peace in the Middle East, New York City,
June 24-July 8, 1968.
The Arabs had repudiated the Armistice
agreements. Previously the Arabs had
treated them as perpetuating a state of
war, though the Charter precludes the ac-
ceptance of such a state. Thereby border
raids and the blocking of the Suez Canal
and the Gulf of Aqaba had been justified.
In other words, the Arab states had treated
the Armistice Agreements as limiting Is-
raeli action but not curtailing their activ-
ities. The Security Council Resolution in
omitting reference to the Armistice Agree-
ments implicitly supported the Israel
position. Israel could not withdraw to
"recognized boundaries" unless they were
first agreed upon.
The Arab states have not themselves
consistently opposed the seizure of terri-
tory by force as manifested by the Jorda-
nian occupation of the West Bank and part
of Jerusalem until 1967 and also by
Egypt's occupation of Gaza. Furthermore,
the U.A.R. and the U.S.S.R. supported
India's taking of Goa in the Security Coun-
cil and the Arab states supported Indo-
nesia's threat to force with respect to West
Irian. 4
An issue which has served to antagonize
some sectors of public opinion has been
the Israeli retaliatory raids such as the raid
on the Beirut Airport. However, retalia-
tory raids by Israel are intended as retal-
iation to an organized campaign of terror
by Arab terrorist groups who are aided
and abetted by the Arab governments. The
purpose is to influence Arab decision-
makers to discourage such raids, to com-
municate a claim with respect to future
1- Halderman, supra note 12.
behavior. Israel has significantly refrained
from pursuing a policy of counter terror,
either in the adjacent Arab states or in the
occupied territories. The retaliatory raids
stem from the problem forced upon the
Israeli government by Arab terrorist ac-
tivity. 15
To many left wing groups Israel has
erroneously come to symbolize imperial-
ism. This outlook stems partly from Is-
rael's association with Britain and France
in the Sinai-Suez crisis. However this can
be refuted by pointing out that Israel's ob-
jectives differed from those of France and
England in that Israel was motivated by
considerations of self-defense.
The imperialist argument can also be
met by stressing that Israel herself is a
victim of imperialism, having had to
struggle against British rule. Indeed, the
pattern of the Israeli struggle was adopted
by the Egyptians in driving the British out
of Suez and in Cyprus. Another form of
imperialism, the big power politics, has
victimized both Israel and the Arab states.
Both the United States, by sending arms to
Iraq and forming the Baghdad Pact, by
supporting King Feisal of Saudi Arabia
and Hussein of Jordan and by opposing
Nasser, and the Soviet Union, by its sup-
port of the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq, have
exacerbated the Middle East conflict and
exploited it for their own ends.
Israel herself is the product of a radical
tradition reflected in the Kibbutz move-
ment and the idealism of labor Zionists.
15 Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International
Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L LAw 415
(1969).
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Certainly, monarchist regimes like Hus-
sein, Feisal, and that in Kuwait cannot be
regarded as revolutionary. Nasser, despite
his rhetoric, maintained a police state and
his policies in Yemen smacked of im-
perialism. Furthermore, he recruited
former Nazis as advisors and came to
power with the support of moderates,
hardly credentials for a revolutionary.
Syria, despite the fact that the regime calls
itself socialist, is ruled by a military clique.
The Arab societies, despite extensive re-
forms in the U.A.R., remain stratified and
fragmented with a small upper class and a
huge number of Fallah or peasants. Those
who compare the struggle to Viet Nam
would find the Arab society analogous to
South Viet Nam. Accordingly, the revolu-
tionary rhetoric of the El Fatah should be
taken with skepticism.
Actually, Israel, particularly since the
six-day June War of 1967, has become the
symbol of liberalism and progressivism
behind the Iron Curtain, constituting the
catalyst for the liberal movement in
Czechoslovakia and student unrest in
Poland. It was for no small reason that
the Communist regimes have so bitterly
opposed "Zionism." The defeat by Israel
of Arab forces heavily armed by the
Soviets constituted an important symbol of
triumph over oppression to the countries
of Eastern Europe. This is a fact which
should be stressed in appealing to the New
Left and to other groups.
Accordingly, Israel has been compelled
to take matters into its own hands since
its birth by resorting to war, because the
international community through the
United Nations has been incapable of
undertaking concrete action to maintain
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peace in the area and to implement its
decisions. Past experience has demon-
strated that international guarantees can-
not be relied upon. Israel, both in 1956
and 1967 was forced to make the first
strike because if it waited for the other side
to fire the first shot, the result could well
have been disastrous, due to its then lim-
ited territory and truncated boundaries.
Present boundaries, pending a peace
treaty, provide Israel with a greater margin
of safety.
Israel's existence is morally and legally
justified. 16 It is the only place homeless
Jews can go. The absence of Israel in the
1930's and early 1940's deprived the Jews
of a place of refuge where hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, might have been
saved from the Nazi crematoria. Migra-
tion to the United States or other Western
countries was blocked by bureaucratic
bigotry and other factors. The international
community turned its face from saving the
Jews of Europe. The Vatican and even
Jewry at large failed to raise their voices
to express moral indignation. Jewish
apathy is a shocking trait, but it is attribu-
table to misguided leaders. The experience
demonstrated that the Jewish people must
be masters of their own fate, and this can
be achieved through the State of Israel.
The ghosts of Auschwitz, Dachau, Buch-
16 M. SHUKR, THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMI-
NATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS (1965); L. SOHN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON UNITED NATIONS LAW
429 (1967); U.N. Declaration of Human Rights,
art. 21; G.A. Res., U.N. Doc. A/555, at 71
(1948). See H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (1950); see also G.A. Res. 545, 6 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 20, at 33-37, U.N. Doc. A/2119
(1952); G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp.
16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/L 323 (1960).
enwald, Bergen-Belsen, and Treblinka, and
other horror centers of atrocities point ac-
cusatory fingers at world society. Israel
has evolved from the holocaust. The very
fact of the holocaust and the failure of in-
ternational society to prevent it justifies
the existence of Israel.
Proposed International Public Relations
Program For Israel
I. The following ideas should be ex-
pressed:
A. The Jewish state began originally
as a revolutionary movement intent
not only on establishing a home-
land for the Jewish people, but
also on creating new forms of social
justice expressed in terms of Kib-
butz, socialism, dignity of labor,
conquest of the desert.
1. This will attract the New Left.
However, the point should be
acknowledged that to some Is-
raelis the long controlled domi-
nance of the labor parties has
led to a smug conservatism.
Efforts should be undertaken
within Israel to reevaluate its
programs. The role of the Is-
raeli Left should be brought
out in this context.
2. The fact that Israel is not a
utopian society should be ad-
mitted, but that efforts for im-
provement are being under-
taken.
B. Stress should be given the fact that
to Zionism the idea of forcible
eviction of the Arabs out of Pales-
tine was abhorrent and that some
Zionist groups, even today, visual-
ize a bi-national state. The Arab
refugee problem is not the respon-
sibility of Israel alone.
C. The issue of self-determination for
the Arab people in Palestine or of
Arab rights is a false issue. Inter-
national decision-makers had de-
termined that the Jewish people as
well as the Arab inhabitants had a
right in Palestine. The Arab leaders
refused to cooperate within this
framework by insisting on an ex-
clusive Arab state despite the exis-
tence of about thirteen other Arab
states according self-determination
to the Arab people. Arab leaders
today refuse to accept the rights
of Jewish self-determination de-
spite recognition of such rights by
international law.
D. The Arab leaders have in fact
sought the disintegration of the
State of Israel through military in-
vasion or by mass repatriation of
Israel refugees whose leaders have
openly proclaimed would result in
dissolving the State of Israel. The
Arab states have in effect assumed
a position of a zero sum game
whereby they demand the complete
surrender of their opponent, in-
cluding its very existence.
E. Both the Israelis and the Arab
states are victims of outside forces.
1. Both have been victimized by
British duplicity.
2. The Jews were greatly affected
by the Nazi holocaust.
a. The demand for Jewish im-
migration to Palestine was
greatly increased. A more
gradual migration, absent
the holocaust, might not
have evoked as much ten-
sion with the Arab commu-
nity.
b. The failure of other coun-
tries to provide a refuge for
Jewish victims or to act to
protect the Jews caused the
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Jewish people to lose faith
on reliance upon Western
goodwill and to act on their
own through establishment
of a Jewish state.
c. The memory of the holo-
caust makes Jews deter-
mined that never again can
this happen as demonstrated
by Jewish reaction to Arab
threats. Since the June War,
Israeli Jews no longer rely
on others nor on interna-
tional institutions for pro-
tection, but seek to be mas-
ters of their own fate.
d. The memory of the holo-
caust has caused Jews in the
Diaspora to evoke a strong
emotional response when
the existence of Israel is
endangered.
e. The holocaust has caused
many non-Jews, particularly
in the German Federal Re-
public to support Israel in
expiation for feelings of
guilt.
3. Russian and American rivalries
have exacerbated the conflict
by exploiting rivalries between
Arab states, thereby inducing
more extreme positions against
Israel, and by selling arms and
thus promoting an escalating
arms race. The big powers have
exploited the Israel-Arab con-
flict to maintain a diplomatic
position in the region. Big
power rivalries, as reflected in
the Security Council, has pre-
vented the imposition of the
rule of law for the region.
4. The present problems stem di-
rectly from the cynical failure
of Britain and the United Na-
tions in 1948 to exert influence
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to discourage the Arab states
from invading Palestine and
going to war with Israel. The
Arabs, a proud people, find it
psychologically difficult to ac-
cept the fact they were de-
feated; the acceptance of the
existence of Israel means rec-
ognizing defeat. That the Arab
armies would be unable to tri-
umph over Israeli forces was
prognosticated by British mili-
tary intelligence a year in ad-
vance, a fact the British colonial
and foreign offices, blinded by
bigotry, refused to accept, hop-
ing the Arab armies would
eliminate Zionism as a factor
and thereby advance British im-
perialist goals, in the Middle
East. Neither Britain, the
United States, nor the United
Nations were willing to act to
avoid an armed conflict and
the ensuing consequences. The
British practically invited the
Arab armies, particularly Jor-
dan, to invade, but later im-
posed an arms embargo on the
Arab states, thereby double-
crossing them.
F. The international community, nei-
ther through the United Nations
nor through other means, has ever
shown a willingness to take affir-
mative action to maintain peace in
the region or to assure the survival
of the State of Israel. The world
community in 1948, 1956 and
1967, demonstrated an inability to
act affirmatively to prevent destruc-
tion of the State of Israel, prevent
border raids and terrorist activities,
assure free navigation to Israeli
shipping, or promote peace. Israel
has been compelled to act alone
for her survival.
II. The following measures should be un-
dertaken:
A. The salient facts should be pub-
lished and disseminated.
B. The utterances of Arab propagan-
dists and writings of Arab sympa-
thizers should be carefully moni-
tored. The Arab position and that
of the other critics of Israel should
be analyzed and refuted point by
point. Scholarly study must be un-
dertaken.
C. Jews, Israelis, diverse sections of
the general public, Arabs and Arab
sympathizers have differing images
of Israel and the Middle East con-
flict. Accordingly, inquiries and
seminars should be undertaken to
determine the manner in which
Israel is perceived by differing
groups and the means for project-
ing a favorable image. This in-
volves the application of anthropo-
logical, psychological, sociological,
legal, political and historical
studies.
D. The general public should be in-
formed of Jewish history and cul-
ture and of the ideology of the
Zionist movement in relation to
Israel.
